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The Two Faces of Unionism
ABSTRACT
This study delineates and assesses the relative accuracy of two views
of trade unions in the U.S. In the first, which we call the "monopoly"
view, unions are a detrimental force in advanced capitalist systems; unions
do little more than raise the wages of their members beyond what they would
otherwise be, increasing the degree of economic inefficiency and inequality.
In the second, which we refer to as the "collective voice/institutional
response" view, unions provide workers with collective voice, which is
essential in the absence of meaningful opportunities for individual exit;
this voice elicits institutional responses which dramatically change the
nature of the employment relationship and, in so doing, increases the levels
of productivity and equality in many settings.
The evidence presented indicates that those who focus on the monopoly
face of unionism and ignore the collective voice/institutional response view
are likely to hold erroneous beliefs about unions in this country. The
facts indicate that on net unions do ~ reduce efficiency or equality and
are generally democratic and non-corrupt organizations.
Richard B. Freeman
James L. Medoff




Trade unions are the principal institution of workers in modern
capitalist societies, as endemic as large firms, oligopolistic organization
of industries,and governmental regulation of free enterprise. For over two
hundred years, since the days' of Adam Smith, there has been widespread
disagreement about the effects of unions on the economy. On the one side
are economists including John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall and Richard Ely
(one of the founders of the American Economic Association)wto have viewed
unions as having major positive effects on the economy. On the other side
are economist!? such..as, Henry Simons and Fritz Machlup who have stressed
the adverse effects of unions on the national dividend. In the 1930s and
1940s unions were at the center of attentiort among intellectuals, with
most social scientists viewing them as an important positive force in
society. In recent years, unionism has become a more peripheral topic
and unions have come to be viewed less positively. Less and less space in
social science journals, magazines, and newspapers is devoted to unions.
For example, the fraction of articles in major economics journals treating
trade unionism dropped from 9.2 percent in the 1940s to 5.1 percent in the
1950s to 0.4 percent in the early 1970s. What is written is increasingly
unfavorable. The press often paints unions as organizations which are
socially unresponsive, elitist, nondemocratic, or ridden with crime.
Our analysis of the content of articles on unions in two major
national news journals, Newsweek and Time, shows an increase in the
percent of lines of print unfavorable to unions from 34 percent in the
1950s to 51 percent in the 1970s. Economists, into whose domain
analysis of trade unions naturally falls, at present generally treat unions
uni~imensionallyas monopolies whose sole function is to raise wages. Since2
monopolistic wage increases are socially deleterious, in that they can
be expected to induce both inefficiency and inequality, most economic
studies judge unions imPlicitly or explicitly as having a negative impact
1 on the economy.
According to our'recent research on the subject, treatment of unions
as organizations without solidaristic or purposive values, whose sole function
is to raise wages, is seriously misleading. While unions appear to raise wages
above competitive levels, they also have significant nonwage effects which
influence diverse aspects of modern industrial life. By providing workers
with a voice both at the work place and in the political arena, unions can
and do positively affect the functioning of the economic and social systems.
Although research on the nonwage effects of trade unions is by no means
complete and some results will surely change as more evidence is available,
sufficient work has been done to yield the broad outlines of a new view
of unionism.
The Collective Voice/Institutional Response View of Unions
One key dimension of the new work on trade unionism can be best
understood by recognizing that societies have two basic mechanisms for
dealing with divergences between desired social conditions and actual
conditions. The first is the classic market mechanism of exit and entry,
which is represented by individual mobility. The dissatisfied consumer
switches products. The diner whose soup is too salty seeks another restaurant.
The unhappy couple divorces. In the labor market, exit is synonymous
with quits, ~mile entry consists of new pires by the firm. By leaving less
desirable jobs for more desirable jobs or by refusing bad jobs, individuals
pena~ize the bad employer and reward the good, leading to an overall
improvement in the efficiency of the social system. The basic theorem of3
neoclassical economics is that, under well-specified conditions, the exit
and entry, or mobility of persons (the hallmark of free enterprise),
produces a "Pareto-optimum" (a situation where no one can be made better
off without making someone worse off). Economic analysis can be viewed
as a detailed study of the implications of the exit-entry mode of adjust-
ment and of the way in which actual economies do or do not operate in the
prescribed manner. As long as the exit-entry market mechanism is viewed
as the only efficient means for such adjustment, institutions such as
unions must necessarily be viewed as impediments to the optimal operation
of a capitalist economy.
There is, however, a second mode of adjustment. This is the political
mechanism, which Albert Hirschman has termed "voice" in his important
book Exit, Voice and Loyalty. "Voice" refers to the process of direct
communication designed to bring actual and desired conditions closer
. together. It means talking about problems: complaining to the store
about a poor product rather than taking business elsewhere; telling the
chef that the SOUp ,had too much salt; discussing marital problems,
possibly with a marriage counselor, rather than going to the divorce
court. In a political context, voice is participation in the democratic
process, through voting, discussion, logrolling, and so on. Not sur-
prisingly, voice is studied by political scientists, who in general
regard citizen participation as the optimal means for solving community
problems.
The distinction between the two mechanisms is best illustrated by
a specific situation: for instance, concern about school quality in a given
locality. The exit solution to poor schools is to move to a different
community or to enroll children in a private school,thereby "taking one's4
business elsewhere." The voice solution would involve political action
to improve the school system, through election of school boards, Parent
Teacher Association meetings, .and related direct activities.
In the job market,voice consists of discussing with an employer
conditions that ought to be changed, rather than quitting. In modern
industrial economies, particularly in large enterprises, a trade union
is the vehicle for collective voice, providing workers as a group with
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bargaining with an employer is necessary for effective voice at the work
place for two reasons.
First, many important aspects of an industrial setting are "public
goods," which affect the well-being (negatively or positively) of
every employee, reducing the incentive for any single person to express
his preferences and invest time and money in changing conditions that
benefit all. Safety conditions, lighting, heating, the speed of a
promotion line; the layoff, work-sharing, cyclical-wage adjustment, and
promotion policies of the firm; a formal grievance procedure; or a pension
plan obviously affect the entire work force in the same way that defense,
sanitation, and fire protection affect the entire citizenry. Externalities
(things done by one individual (or firm) that also affect the well-being
of another) and public goods at the work place call for collective decision-
making. Without the policing of a collective organization, the incentive
for the individual to take into account the effects of his or her actions
on the well-being of others or express his or her preferences or invest
time and money in changing conditions is likely to be too small. Why not
let Harry do it and enjoy the benefits at no cost? This is, of course,
the classic "free rider" problem which in the union context lies at the heart
of the so-called "union security" versus "right to work" debate.5
Second, workers who are not prepared to exit may be unlikely to reveal
their true preferences to their bosses, fearing that their employers will
punish them in some way. The essence of the employment relationship under
capitalism, as Karl Marx, Ronald Coase, Herbert Simon and numerous other
analysts have recognized, is the exchange between employer and employee
of money for control over a certain amount of the worker's time which the
employer seeks to use in a way that maximizes the value of the output the
employee produces. Even in the case of piece rates, employers monitor
employee activity:to assure the quality of output. As a result,
the way in which the time purchased is utilized must be determined by some inter-
action between workers and their boss. Since the purchaser of the labor power,
the employer, can fire the protester, individual protest is dangerous. A
prerequisite for effective voice concerning the employment relationship is
the protection of activists from being discharged. In the United States
this protection is granted in Sec. 8(u)(3) of the NatiQnal Labor Relations
Act which states that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." It is important to note that, unionism aside, court inter-
pretation of U.S. labor law makes a sharp distinction between collective
and individualistic activity at the work place. While workers who act as a
collective are Erotected from managerial retaliation,an individual acting
alone is not.3
The collective nature of trade unionism fundamentally alters the
operation of a labor market and, hence, the nature of the labor contract
generated. In a nonunion setting, where exit and entry are the predominant
forms of adjustment, the signals and incentives to firms depend on the pre-
ferences of the "marginal" worker, the one who will leave (or be attracted)6
by particular conditions or changes in conditions. The firm responds
primarily to the needs of this marginal, generally younger, mobile worker
and can within some bounds ignore the preferences of "infra-marginal,"
typically older workers, who, for reasons of skill, knowledge, or rights
that cannot be readily transferred to other enterprises as well as other
costs associated with changing firms, are effectively immobile. In a
unionized setting, by contrast, the union takes account of the preferences
of ~ workers to form an average preference that typically determines
its positio~at the bargaining table. Because unions are political
institutions with elected leaders, they are likely to be responsive to a
different set of preferences than those that dominate in a competitive
labor market.
While social science lacks a theory of political institutions comparable
to the economic model of profit-maximizing firms or utility-maximizing
consumers, virtually any plausible model (e.g., the median voter model, in
which the political institution responds to the desires of the voter in the
middle of the relevant distribution of individuals by their preferences)
would predict that the influence of older, infra-marginal workers relative to
that of younger, marginal employees in determining the relevant employment contracts
would be greater in a unionized as opposed to a nonunionized setting.
In a modern economy, where workers tend to be attached to firms for eight or
more years~ on average, and where younger and older workers are likely to have
different preferences (for instance, regarding pension or health insurance plans
versus take-home pay, or regarding layoffs by inverse seniority versus work-
sharing or cuts in wage growth), the change from a marginal to an average
calculus is likely to lead to a quite different labor contract. When
particular work relations or modes of compensation have sizeable fixed or
set-up costs or are public goods, it can be shown that a calculus based on
the average preference can lead to a contract which, ignoring distributional
effects, is socially more desirable than that based on the marginal preference.More broadly, the entire
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The mix of employment benefits and policies resulting from the 'average
calculus may be economically more "efficient" than that resulting from
the marginal calculus.
The role of unions as a voice institution also fundamentally alters the
social relat~ons of the work place. Perhaps most importantly, a union
constitutes a source of worker power in a firm, diluting managerial authority
and offering members a measure of due process. In particular, the union
innovation of a grievance and arbitration system permits workers to protest
particular managerial actions concerning nearly all aspects of the labor
exchange. While 99 percent of major U.S. collective bargaining
contracts provide for the filing of grievances and 95 percent provide for
arbitration of disputes that are not settled between the parties,
relatively few nonunion firms have comparable procedures for settling
disagreements between workers and supervisors.4
industrial jurisprudence system, by whiqh many workplace decisions are
made on the basis of negotiated rules (such as seniority) as
opposed to supervisory judgment (or whim) and are subject to cha~lenge
through the grievance/arbitration procedure, represents a major change in
the power relations within firms. As a result, in unionized firms workers
are more willing and able to express discontent and to object to managerial
decisions. Although extent and form differ among establishments and unions,
there is no doubt that unionism alters the distribution of power in firms.
As a collective alternative to individualistic actions in the market,
unions are much more than simple monopolies that raise wages and restrict the
competitive adjustment process. Given imperfect information and public goods
in industrial settings and conflicting interests at the work place and in the
political arena, unionism provides an alternative mechanism for bringing about
important and socially desirable changes. This is not to deny that unions have
monopolistic power nor that they use this power to raise wages for a select part of the
IA8
work force. The point is that unionism has two faces, each of which leads
to a different view of the institution: one, which is at the fore
in eCbnomic analysis, is that of a monopoly; the other is that of a voice
institution. To understand fully what unions do in modern industrial
economies, it is necessary to examine both.
The second central dimension of our research is an analysis of how
other institutions in our society respond to various union stimuli. We have found
that in response to trade unions management has substantially altered
both its personnel and production practices. These responses represent a key
determinant of the ultimate economic impact of unionism, as was rightfully
stressed in the classic volume by Slichter, Healy, and Livernash, The Impact
of Collective Bargaining on Management. If management adopts more rational
policies toward the work force and uses the collective bargaining process
to learn about and improve the operation of the work place and the
production process, unionism can be a significant plus. If one of the main
effects of unions on management is to encourage "investigation and reflection,"
as Slichter, et ale claim, there is a reasonable chance that union organization
can improve managerial efficiency. On the other hand, if management reacts
negatively to collective bargaining or is prevented by unions ·from reorganizing
the work process, unionism can have a negative affect on the performance of
the firm. The important point is that just as there are two sides to the
market, demand and supply, there are two'forces determining the economic effects
of collective bargaining, managements and unions. The economic impact of bargaining
and the nature of industrial relations depend on the policies and actions of
both. It is for this reason that we use the two terms collective voice and institu-
tional response to refer to the second view of unionism under consideration.
Figure I sets out the difference between the monopoly and
collective voice/institutional response'views of the impact of unionism on9
three major social phenomena: economic efficiency, or how and what goods are
produced; economic equity, or income distribution; and the operation of
unions as organizations. While no sophisticated adherent of the monopoly
model would deny the voice aspects of unionism and no industrial relations
expert would gainsay the monopoly effects, the polar dichotomization usefully
highlights the facets of unionism stressed by the two views.
The monopoly and collective voice/institutional response views of
unionism are strikingly different, in many instances giving completely opposite
pictures of the institution. In the former, unions are by nearly all criteria
socially undesirable impediments to the good society; in the latter, unions
have many valuable features which contribute to the functioning of the economy.
Adopting only the monopoly view,the current dwindling in the fraction of
private sector wage and salary workers who are unionized (from 37 percent
5 in 1~58 to 29 percent in 1974) is a desirable development; it should be
associated with ~ncreased productivity and reduced inequality and, thus,
ought perhaps to be encouraged. Accepting solely the collective voice/
institutional response view, the dwindling of private sector unionization
has serious deleterious economic and social consequences and should
most likely be an issue deserving public attention.
Since, in fact, unions have both monopoly and collective voice/institu-
tiona1 response components, the key question for understanding unionism in the
United States relates to the relative importance of these two faces. Are
unions primarily monopolistic institutions or are they primarily voice
institutions which induce socially beneficial responses? What weights
should be placed on the two extreme views to obtain a realistic picture
of the role of trade unionism in the United States?
To answer these important questions, we have studied a wide variety
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and between union and nonunion workers, and we have discussed many relevant
issues with representatives of management, labor officials, and industrial-
relations experts. Although additional work will certainly alter some of
the specifics, our research has yielded several important results which
suggest that unions do a great deal more than win monopoly wage gains for
their members. In the next three sections, the two sets of beliefs
concerning union effects on efficiency and equity and the nature of the
union as a political organization are developed further and examined
in light of the existing evidence.
Economic Efficiency: The Amount and Mix of Goods Produced
Unions can affect society's "economic efficiency" through their
impact on the economy's ability to produce output from its limited
resources and through their impact on the composition of this output.
The Amount Produced: Beliefs. In the monopoly view unions reduce
society's output below what it could be in three ways. First, union-
won wage increases cause a misallocation of resources by inducing organized
firms to hire fewer workers, to use more capital per worker, and to hire
higher quality workers than is socially efficient. Second, union contract
provisions, such as limits on the load handled by workers, restrictions
on tasks performed, req~irements that unnecessary work be done, and so
forth reduce the output yielded by a given amount of capital and labor
power. Third, strikes called to force management to accept union demands
cause a substantial ·reduction in gross national product.
The collective voice/institutional response model, by contrast, directs
attention to important routes by which unionism can raise productivity. According12
to the analysis, one of these potential paths is the reduction of quits.
As workers' voice increases in an establishment, less reliance need be
placed on the exit and entry mechanism to obtain desired work conditions.
Since hiring and training costs are lower and ~he functioning of work
groups is less disrupted when quit rates are low, reductions in voluntary
attrition due to unionism can raise efficiency.
The fact that senior workers are likely to be relatively more powerful
in enterprises where decisions are based on voice instead of exit and
entry points to another way in which unions can raise productivity.
Under unionism, promotions and other rewards tend to be less dependent
in any precise way on iridividual performance and more dependent on seniority.
As a result, in union plants, feelings of rivalry among individuals
are likely to be less than in nonunion plants and the amount of informal
training and assistance that workers are willing to provide one another greater.
The importance of seniority in firms in Japan, together with the permanent
employment guaranteed some workers have often been cited as factors
increasing the productivity of Japanese enterprises. It is of course
important to recognize that seniority can also reduce productivity by
placing less able persons in certain jobs.
Unionism can also raise efficiency by pressuring management into tightening
job production standards and accountability in an effort to respond to union
demands while maintaining profits. Slichter, et al. writing in 1960 comment:
"The challenge that unions presented to management has, if viewed broadly,
created superior and better balanced management, even though some exceptions
must be recognized." Their conclusion means that unionized management is
able to extract more output from a given amount of inputs than is management
which is not confronted with a union stimulus. This appears to occur largely
by forcing modern personnel practices on the firm in place of traditional
paternalism. Management's ability to make such improvements is a function13
of the union~S cooperation, since the union can perform a helpful role in
explaining changes in the day-to-day routine. One recent study supportive
of this view reports that while union workers spend more time on formal breaks,
they spend a comparable amount less time on informal ones and report working
harder than nonunion workers. It is important to recognize that productivity
gains from improved methods of management in the face of unionism run counter
to the standard assumption of neoclassical economics that all enterprises
operate at peak efficiency. It is, however~ consistent with the
"satisficing" models of· firms developed by the reCent. Nobel Prize winner
Herbert Simon and other analysts and with the model of X-inefficiency put forth
.by Harvey Leibenstein; in these models, firms strive for maximum efficiency only
when they are under severe pressure from competitors, unions, or other
external forces.6
Finally, under the voice view, the apparatus of collective bargaining
opens a potentially important communication channel between workers and
management which is likely to increase the flow of information between the
two, possibly improving the produccivity of the enterprise. As Reynolds
has observed, "UnionS" can do valuable work by pointing out improvements
that perhaps should have been obvious to management but were not, and that,
once discovered, can be installed with a net gain to the company as well as
the workers ." 7
The Amount Produced: Evidence. Most of the econometric analysis of
unions has focused on the question of central concern to the monopoly view:
How ls.rge is the union wage effect? In his classic book, Unionism and Relative
Wages, H. G. Lewis summarized the results of this analysis through the early
1960s as showing that, while differing over time and across settings, the
union relative wage effect averages on the order of 10-15 percent: as a result of
collective bargaining, a union member makes about 10-15 percent more than an
otherwise comparable worker (i.e., someone working in the same occupation, same
industry, same geographic area, etc.) who is not a member. Later wprk14
using larger data files which have information permitting more extensive
controls and employing more complex statistical techniques ten~to confirm
Lewis' generalization. While unions in some environments raise wages by an enormous
8 amount, the average estimated union wage effect is by no means overwhelming.
As predicted by the mOnopoly wage model, the capital-labor ratio and
average "quality" of labor both appear to be somewhat greater than "optimal"
in union settings. However, the total loss in output due to the mis-
allocation of resources resulting from the union wage effect appears to
be miniscule; an analysis done by Albert Rees suggests that the loss is
less than .3 of one percent of gross national product.9 In 1975, that would
amount to $21.00 per person in the U.S. Even this estimate is likely to be
too high if one considers the other important and relevant distortions
in the economy. In particular, in the presence of elements of monopsony, which
exist when there are costs to changing one's employer, union monopoly wage gains
can raise rather than reduce efficiency. Other distortions, however,
might cause the estimate to be understated. ,
The Collective Voice/Institutional Response Routes
One of the central tenets of the collective-voice/institutional response
model is that among workers receiving the same pay unions reduce employee turn-
over and its associated costs by offering "voice" as an alternative to exit.
Empirical research using both information on the job changes and employment
status of thousands of individuals from newly available computerized data sets
and industry-level turnover rates shows that with diverse factors, including
wages, held constant, unionized workers have significantly lower quit rates
than do nonunion workers who are comparable in other respects. As Table 1
shows, the differences between the organized and unorganized workers are very
large. Moreover, consistent with the claim that unions provide better
representation for more senior workers, the evidence suggests a more sizeable
reduction in exit and increase in job tenure for older male workers than for15
younger male workers. A major non-wage reason for the greater attachment
of workers to firms under unionism is likely to be the existence of formal
grievance systems, which provide the opportunity to protest seemingly
unjust conditions without resorting to exit. Since employee turnover
is costly, the reduction of quits induced by union voice is one way in
which unions reduce production costs and thus raise labor productivity.
Table 1· Estimates of the Effect of Unionism on Quits
and Tenure with Firma
Sample
All workers (Michigan Panel
Study of Income Dynamics)
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aFigures are based on multivariate regression analyses reported in R.B. Freeman,
"The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism Job Tenure, Quits,
and Separations," Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming, and in "Why
Do Unions Increase Job Tenure?", National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper.
As noted earlier, unionism can positively or negatively affect productivity
in ways other than reducing turnover, leaving the net effect of unions on
productivity uncertain. Traditional analyses of unionism and productivity based
on case studies of establishments (especially by Slichter, Healy, and
Livernash) have cited examples both where positive effects dominate and where
negative effects dominate. By their very nature, however, case studies cannot16
give a broad quantitative assessment of the net effect of unionism on
productivity.
Analysis of newly available data on unionism and output per worker in
many establishments or sectors suggest at the least that the monopoly view of
unions as a major deterrent to productivity is erroneous and that in some
settings unionism is associated with higher rather than lower productivity,
not only because of greater capital intensity and labor quality but also
because of what can best be termed institutional response factors.
Table 2 summarizes the available estimates of the union productivity
effect. The calculations in the table are based on statistical production function
Table 2: Estimates of the Impact of Unionism on Producttvity
Setting Estimated Increase (+) or Decrease (-)
in Output per Worker Due to Unionisma
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aAll calculations are based on analyses which control for capital-labor
ratios and diverse other factors that may influence productivity.
bFrom C. Brown and J. Medoff, "Trade Unions in the Production Process,"
Journal of Political Economy, June 1978, pp. 355-378.
~rom J. Frantz, "The Impact of Trade Unions 'on Productivity in the Wood
Household Furniture Industry," Senior Honors Thesis, Harvard University,
March 1976.
~rom K. Clark, "Unions and Productivity in the Cement Industry," Doctoral
Thesis, Harvard University, September 1978.
~rom R.B. Freeman, J.L." Medoff and P. Connerton, "Industrial Relations and
Productivity: A Study of the U.S. Bituminous Coal Industry," in progress.17
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analyses which relate output per worker to unionization controlling for capital
per worker, the skill of workers (in some of the analyses), and other relevant
factors. While all of the studies are subject to some statistical problems
and thus must be treated cautiously, a general pattern emerges. In manufacturing,
productivity in the organized sector appears to be substantially higher than in
the unorganized'sector, by an amount that could roughly offset the increase
in total costs attributable to the union wage effect. Analysis of cross-state
production figures within 2-digit SIC manufacturing industries yields an
estimated average productivity effect of from 20 to 25 percent. While .this
estimate is likely to be overstated by the gross nature of 2-digit SIC industries,
the 20 to 25 percent figure is of the same magnitude as estimates with these
data of the extent to which average costs are increased by union wage premia.
Analyses of individual establishments in the wooden household furniture
industry and in the cement industry confirm the finding of a significant
positive union productivity effect which is of roughly the same magnitude
as the impact of the union wage effect on average costs in the industry under
consideration. The cement industry study provides especially valuable
information, since output can be measured in pure quantity terms and the
study contains data on plants before and after unionization as well as on
organized and unorganized plants at a given point in time.
The importance of some of the specific routes by which unionism
positively affects the amount of output produced has been analyzed. In
the typical manufacturing industry the substantially lower quit rates under
collective bargaining can explain about one-fifth of the estimated positive
union productivity effect. Clark's discussions with individuals at the
recently organized cement plants reveal that the entrance of a union was
usually followed by major alterations in operations. Interestingly, the
enterprise typically changed plant management, suggesting that the union18
drive was an important signal to top management of ineffective lower-level
management,. and thus, the drive provided increased communication or shock
of a distinctive kind. Perhaps most importantly, the discussions with union
and management officials in the cement industry indicated that firms often
adopted more efficiency-oriented and less paternalistic personnel policies in
response to unionism in order to raise productivity to meet higher wage demands.
On the other side of the ~icture, the analysis of produ~tivity in organized
and nonorganized underground bituminous coal mines indicates that as industrial
relations in the union sector deteriorated in the late 1960s and 1970s,
unionism became associated with negative productivity effects. The stri1:ing
change in the estimated impact of unionism on productivity in this industry
during the past decade highlights the important fact that the effects of
unionism are not universa1"constants but rather depend on specific industrial
reJ,ationssettings. Collective bargaining can raise productivity as a result
of some practices and good industrial relations; collective bargaining can
reduce productivity as a result of other practices and bad industrial
relations. In manufacturing, the factors which raise or at least do not
lower productivity dominate; in coal, a~ the internal problems of the United
Mine Workers have grown and the ability of management to deal effectively
with labor issues seems to have deteriorated (most likely because rapid
industry growth has yielded supervisors who are on average younger and have
less experience in labor relations than was typical prior to the late 1960s),
the factors which lower productivity have come to dominate. An important, and
as yet uncompleted, task is to determine the differential impact of various
industrial relations practices on productivity and to discover, as far as
is possible, the reasons for these.differences.
The evidence just cited suggests that unionism may increase productivity
in some settings and decrease it in others. If the increase in productivity is
greater than the increase in average unit costs due to the union wage effect then
the profit rate will increase; conversely, if the union wage effect increases19
unit costs more than unionism increases productivity the rate of profit will fall.
There is limited tentative evidence that, on average, net profits are reduced
somewhat by unionism, particularly in oligopolistic industries; however, there
are notable exceptions where the rate of profit increased a result of unionism.
At present, there is no definitive accounting of what proportion of the union wage
effect comes at the expense of capital, other labor, or consumers and what portion
is offset by previously unexploited possibilites for productivity improvements.
Finally, it is important to note that despite what some critics of
unions might claim, strikes do not seem to cost society a substantial
amount of goods and services. For the economy as a whole, the percent of
total working time lost directly to strikes during the past two decades has
never been greater than .5 of one percent and has averaged about .2 of one
percent. . Even "national emergency disputes"--those which would be expected
to have the largest repercussions on the economy--do not have major dele-
terious imracts:O Though highly publicized, the days idle because of the
direct and indirect effects of strikes represent only a miniscule fraction
of the toal days worked in the u.s. economy.
The Mix of Employee Benefits and Personnel Practices: Beliefs. Under
the monopoly view, the exit and entry of workers permits each individual to
find a firm offering the mix of employee benefits and personnel policies that
he or she prefers. As noted earlier, however, the efficiency of this mechanism
breaks down when there are public goods at the work place and for workers who
are not able to change firms easily. In the voice view, a union provides
management with information at the bargaining table concerning policies
affecting its entire membership (e.g., the mix of the employee compensation
package or the firm's emplo~ent practices during a downturn) which
can be expected to be different than that derived from the movements of marginal
workers. Hence, it is likely that the package of employee benefits and employ-
~ent adjustment policies will be different in firms covered by collective
bargaining than in those which are not. To what extent does the mix ofgoods at the work place differ betl7een union arid nonunion .firms?"
20
Evidence Concerning Fringes. Data on the remuneration of individual
workers and on the expenditures for employees by firms show that the
proportion of compensation allotted to fringe benefits is markedly higher
for organized blue-collar workers than for similar nonunion workers. Within
most industries, important fringes such as pensions and life, ac~id~nt,
and health insurance are much more likely to be found in unionized
establishments than in those which are nonunion. While some of the
difference is attributable to the higher wages paid to union workers,
since higher w~ge workers generally "buy" more fringes, Table 3 reveals
that a substantial difference is in fact due to the effect of unionism on
the nature of the compensation package received by workers with the same
level of pay. The table also indicates that the greatest increases in
fringes induced by unionism are for the deferred compensation form which
are favored by older, more stable employees; this is consistent with the
view that unions are more responsive to senior, less mobile workers. More
detailed analysis of the pattern of benefits among unionized blue-collar
workers compared to the pattern among white-collar workers in the same
establishment shows that the sizeable union impact is not due largely
to the tendency for unionsto organize firms which have high fringes in
any case, at least as reflected in the compensation packages of the firms'
white-collar employees.
Studies concerning workers' preferences for fringes and managers'
awareness of these preferences provide support for the claim that a
union can provide management with information that affects the composition
of the pay package. For instance, Richard Lester's 1967 review of surveys
of managerial perceptions of worker preferences found "limited data • • •
that workers value benefits more highly compared to wages than employers
11 1 believe their workers do". Equally important is the apparent ro e
of unions in evaluating the complex costs and prospective benefits of
modern fringe benefits and transmitting these facts to their members.Table 3:
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It is unlikely that an individual worker will make the investment required
to understand and judge the true cost and future benefits of alternative
compensation packages. A collective of workers, however, can hire lawyers,
actuaries, and related experts from whom they obtain the expertise needed
to bargain effectively over diverse fringe benefits.
The fact that in many instances nonunion firms have imitated several
of the provisions of union contracts is indicative of the "better" information
available about workers' preferences in union settings. There is no reason for
a nonunion firm to copy what union firms do unless union contracts are
preferred by the average nonunion worker, since the satisfaction of the
average (not the marginal) employee is what is relevant in a union representation
election. It is important to note that to the extent that nonunion firms
adopt beneficial union-initiated practices, the estimated impact of unionism
on the prevalence of these practices will be understated.
Finally it shoQId be pointed out that the knowledgeable representatives
of both labor and management agree that one of the major functions performed
by American trade unions is to determine a division of the compensation
package acceptable to workers. They recognize that some of the most important
bargaining under unionism goes on inside the union, where the desires of
workers with disparate interests are weighted in a political process to
decide the union's positions at the bargaining table.
Evidence Concerning Adjustments to Economic Downturns. One of
the most important personnel decisions made by a firm is how to adjust its
employment and wages in response to swings in economic demand. During a
downturn, firms must choose among alternative adjustment mechanisms, such
as temporary layoffs, cuts in wage growth, average hours reductions, and
voluntary attrition. The evidence from various data sets presented in Table 4
indictates that the layoff mechanism is used to a much greater extent in
unionized establishments than in those that are nonunion. However,23
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it is important to note that the vast majority of these layoffs are
temporary,in that the laid off members await rehire and are recalled after
a short spell of unemployment.
By contrast, evidence on the effect of swings in product demand on
wages shows responsiveness of wage rates to be smaller in union than in
nonunion firms. During the very severe economic downturn from May 1973 to
May 1975, for example, while the fraction of hourly blue-collar union members
unemployed due to layoffs grew more than twice as much as the comparable
fraction for similar nonmembers, the wages of the unionized workers grew
by 18.1 percent versus 16.6 percent for the nonunion workers. More generally,
analysis of monthly data covering the 1958 tp 1975 period for detailed
manufacturing industries indicates that while the hourly wages of production
workers vary positively with shipments to some extent in nonunion firms
(reducing the need for layoffs), there is virtually no association in
union firms. These findings reflect the fact that since the late 1950s24
about two thirds of the major contract manufacturing work force has come
to be covered by agreements whose duration is three years or more, nearly
all of which have provisions for automatic money wage increaees.12
Why do temporary layoffs dominate alternative adjustment mechanisms to
kmach greater extent in firms that are unionized than in those that are nonunion?
While lower quit rates in the union sector explain some of the differential
use of layoffs, since nonunion firms can rely more heavily on quits to
reduce employment, the question remains as to why unionized firms appear
to use temporary layoffs relatively more than other non-quit adjustment
mechanisms, such as cuts in wage growth or reductions in average hours,
than do nonunion firms.
The most reasonable explanation is that under the provisions found
in most union contracts, senior workers, who can be expected to have
greater power in organized firms, will generally prefer layoffs over the
alternatives. A subsample of the major contracts (those covering 1,000
or more workers) in effect in 1970-71 mentioning 'layoff procedures
indicates that seniority was the "sole" or "primary" factor in rl.~t":,:,,,",.:l.,~_~.:::
layoff rights for 58 percent of the relevant workers; tlte comparable
figure is 7.8 percent- when contracts in which the issue was "subject to local
negotiations" are excluded. In almost a fourth of the subsample of 1970-71
major contracts with layoff provisions, senior employees were allowed to
waive their seniority rights and be laid off, while retaining eligibility
for recall. When recall is a near certainty and seniority is retained
(which is usually the case), and if regular and supplemental unemployment
benefits are obtainable, some senior workers might welcome a short period
on layoff. In addition, they may prefer a short-term layoff to placement
in a relatively undesirable or low paying jOb.13
Hence, senior union members typically incur very small or no costs
under an adjustment policy based on layoffs. They would, however, incur
more under a policy based on an across-the-board reduction in wage growth25
or in average hours worked. Thus, if the preferences of senior workers
were really given greater weight under unionism than in nonunion settings,
as the collective voice/institutional response model claims, we would
expect to find layoffs used to a much greater extent than cuts in wage
growth or work sharing in union settings, as we have in fact observed.
Economic Equity
One of the striking implications of the monopoly view, which runs
counter to. popular thought, is that union wage gains increase inequality
in the labor market. According to the monopoly model, the workers displaced
from unionized firms as a result of union wage gains raise the supply of
labor to nonunion firms, which can be expected to reduce the wages of
nonunion workers. Thus, in the·monopoly view, unionized workers are likely
to be made better off at the expense of nonunion workers. The fact that
those blue-collar workers who are organized would tend to be more skilled and
higher. paid than other blue-collar workers even in the absence of unionism
implies further that this process benefits "labor's elite" at the expense of
those with low skill and earning power. Since many have supported unions
because of. a belief that they reduce economic inequality, the monopoly
view that unions have an adverse effect on the income distribution would,
if true, constitute a telling argument against the union mov~cnt.
The collective voice/institutional response model suggests very different
effects on equity. Given that union decisions are based on a political
process and given that the majority of union members are likely to
have earnings below the mean in any work place, unions can be .expected
to seek to reduce wage inequality. In addition, union members
are likely to favor a less dispersed distribution of earnings for
solidaristic and ideological reasons. Finally, by its nature, collective
bargaining reduces managerial discretion in the wage setting process26
and in this way should also lower dispersion.
The forces leading unions to reduce economic inequality take explicit
form in two distinct union wage policies. First is the long-standing
policy of pushing for "standard rates," defined as uniform piece or time
rates among comparable workers across establishments and impersonal rates
or ranges of rates in a given occupational class within establishments.
The importance of standardizing rates across establishments has long been
recognized. In perhaps the earliest study the Webbs noted that "among trade
union regulations there is one which stands out as practically universal,
namely, the insistence on payment according to the same definite standard,
uniform in its application." The importance of standardization of rates
within establishments has also been widely recognized. Under unionism
pay is usually based on job rates associated with specific occupational
categories, rather than personal rates associated with individuals.
While many large nonunion enterprises today employ similar formal wage
setting practices, the option for personal differentials based on service,
performance, favoritism, or any other factor within a job category is generally
larger than in the union sector. For example, so-called "merit" plans for
wage adjustment appear to be less prevalent in the union than in the nonunion
sector. In the 1970s, while about 43 percent of all companies gave plant
employees 'wage adjustment based on a merit plan,' only 13 percent of major
union contracts mentioned these plans. Overall, according to Slichter, Healy
and Livernash, "the influence of unions has clearly been one of minimizing
and eliminating judgment-based differences in pay for individuals employed
on the same job" and of "removing ability and performance judgments as a factor
in individual pay for job performance." One important potential result of these
policies is -a reduction of inequality, possibly at the expense of efficiency by
reducing the reward for individual effort. Another important potential result of27
this policy is that wage discrimination against minorities is likely to
be less in unionized than in nonunionized settings.14
Second, union policies favoring seniority in promotion and job posting
and bidding systems in which wbrkers are informed about new openings and can
bid for promotions can also be expected to have egalitarian consequences.
The possibility for arbitrary supervisory judgments to determine the career
of a worker is greatly reduced by the development of formal rules which
treat each worker identically.
Thus, according to the monopoly model, trads unionism raises inequality,
whereas according to the collective voice/institutional response model, it
reduces inequality. Which of these effects dominates?
Until the advent of computerized data files, the information needed
to answer this question was unavailable. While estimates were made of
the increase in inequality due to monopoly wage gains, estimates of the
reduction in dispersion due to standard rate policies could not be made.
Newly available data on thousands of unionized and nonunionized workers
permit, for the first time, estimates of the reduction of dispersion
within the organized sector and of the net effect of unionism on inequality.
Our empirical estimates based on the new data show that standardization
policies have had a sizeable impact on wage inequality, reducing dispersion,-
and that the standard rate effect dominates the-monopoly-wageeffect.
On net unions reduce earnings inequality by a significantramount.
The impact of the standard rate policies on dispersion of earnings
is shown in figure 2, which compares the frequency distribution of the natural
logarithm of earnings among unionized and nonunionized male blue collar workers.
If standard rate policies significantly reduced dispersion, the union
distribution would be more peaked and less spread out than the nonunion
distribution. As the figure makes clear, the distribution of earnings isFigure 2:
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a R. B. Freeman, "Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages,"
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 248,
June 1978.29
much less dispersed among.union workers in bot~ the manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing sectors. The upper and lower parts of the frequency
distribution are more compressed and the middle of the distribution
much more peaked among those who are organized.
In addition to reducing earnings inequality among blue collar workers,
union wage policies contribute to equalization of wages by lowering the
differential between covered"blue-collar workers and uncovered white-
collar workers. In manufacturing, while white-collar workers earn, on
average, 49 percent more than blue-collar workers, our estimates indicate
that under unionism this premium is 32 percent. In nonmanufacturing,
while white-eollar workers average 31 percent more than blue-collar workers,
under unionism the estimated differential is only 19 percent.
To obtain the net effect of unionism on earnings inequality it is
necessary to add the decrease in" inequality due to wage standardization and
the decrease due to the reduction in the white collar/blue collar differen-
tial to the increase due to the greater wages of blue-collar union workers
compared to lower paid blue-collar nonunion workers. Table 5 presents the results
of such calculations using the variance of the natural logarithm of earnings as the
measure of inequality. This measure was chosen, rather than other related
indices (such as the well-known Gini coefficient) because variances
are easier to deal with in adding together various effects. The results of
the analysis are not substantively changed by the particular measure of
relative inequality chosen.
The table shows clearly that the dominant effect on earnings in-
equality is the standardization of rates within the union sector (line 4).
As a result of the large reduction in inequality attributable, it appears, to
standard rate policies, the measure of the variance of earnings is reduced30
by 21 percent in manufacturing and by 27 percent in nonmanufacturing. Since
the income distribution is, as Christoper Jencks and other have shown,
relatively stable in the face of dramatic changes in such important social
factors as the distribution of schooling, these effects must be judged
as large. Unionism appears on net to reduce wage dispersion in the United
"
States, which implies that the voice/response effects of the institution
dominate the monopoly wage effect on this front.
Table 5: Estimates of the Contribution of Unionism to the Variance of
a LE>g Ea:l)t1ings ,Among Male Workers
1. Variance in absence of unionism
2. Increase in variance due to monopoly
wage effect
3. Decrease in variance due to reduction
in white collar/blue collar differential
4. Decrease in variance due to within sector
standardization of log of wages
5. Variance in presence of unionism
(1 + 2 + 3 + 4)
6. Percentage effect of unionism on
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National Bureau of Economic Research Working PaperNo. 240, June 1978.
Unions also affect the distribution of earnings between blacks and
whites. Despite conflicts between trade union seniority rules and affirmative
action programs and historic patterns of discrimination by craft unions,
'empirical evidence, as Orley Ashenfelter was first to note, shows clearly that,
on average, unions aid black workers and reduce discriminatory differences.
First, blacks are more likely to be union members than whites and thus more
likely to benefit from union wage gains. In the 1973-75 period, 30 percent of black31
workers were organized compared to 24 percent of white workers. The greater
organization of blacks reflects the fact that this group is overrepresented
among blue-collar factory workers and underrepresented among the less
organized white collar workers. Whileminotities are still not prapantionately
represented in some important craft union~, the latest apprenticeship data
show that 18.1 percent of apprentices in 1976 were minorities, 9.4 percent
being black and 8.7 percent being members of other minority groups.15
Second, unionization reduces discriminatory differences within
organized firms, through the standard-rate and promotion-by-seniority
policies described earlier. While black organized workers make less than
..
white organized workers, the extent of the differential is smaller than
among unorganized workers. Estimates with data from the 1973 to 1975 May
Current Population Surveys show that among blue collar private sector wage and
salar1- workers black hourly wage rates are below white hourly rates by about 9
percent in the organized sector of a typical 3-digit Census industry compared to
about 15 percent in the nonunion sector of the same industry.16 Seniority rules
which are often regarded as inimical to the interests of black workers due to
conflict with affirmative action programs should in the long run be beneficial
to blacks; when promotion depends on seniority, the firm cannot discriminate
on the basis of race.
Third, analysis by Duane Leigh of the effect of unionism on the tenure
and quit behavior of black and white workers taken separately shows that
with wages held constant the turnover of blacks is as much reduced by unions
as the turnover of whites; implying that the nonwage benefits associated
17 with unionism improve conditions as much for blacks as for whites.
On net, while some discrimination is found in the union sector as else-
where in the economy, trade unions raise black earnings relative to white
earnings and, thus, help reduce discriminatory differences.32
Trade Unions as Organizations
Under the monopoly view, the potential. to 'use union monopoly
power to raise wages and to extort funds from firms, particularly small
weak firms, fosters a significant amount of corruption and nondemocratic
behavior in the union movement. Many unions are alleged to be run by
bosses who seek to enhance their own well-being at the expense of the
membership's and by racketeers seeking to ,skim off the monopoly wage
gains. Under the voice view, unions aLe expected to be democratic poli-
tical organizations which are responsive to the will of their members.
While the monopoly view has been highly publicized, the vast majority of
evidence appears to support the voice vi~•
. There are internal and external forces that can be expected to pushunions--
"both locals and internationals--toward being responsive to the wishes of their
members. Unions are, by their constitutions, democratic organizations, which are
supposed to hold conventions or referenda to discern the membership's sentiment
concerning important issues,and fair and frequent elections to assess the members'
satisfaction with their leadership~ While at one time U.s, labor law aealt only
peripherally with the internal workings of unions, the Landrum-Griffin Act, passed
in 1959 in response to the 1957 hearings run by Senator John L. McClellan,
provides strong federal sanctions against corruption and nondemocratic
behavior inside unions. This act contains provisions which: ~equire local,
intermediate, and international unions to hold elections at fixed,reasonably
short intervals; guarante~ members a reasonable opportunity to nominate
candidates, run for office, and freely criticize union leaders and their
policies; prohibit incumbents from using union funds to support the
election of a given candidate for office in the union and from disseminating
propaganda for one candidate without doing as much for his or her opponent;
and require officials to file information on the financial affairs of the union
and its leaders and on its constitutional provisions. Moreover, the country's33
labor law provides an election procedure under which a group of workers can
decertify its union and become unorganized, replace one union with another,
or attempt to change the boundaries of an existing bargaining unit.
The relevant evidence strongly suggests that the vast majority of local and
international unions in the U.S. are quite democratic and only rarely plagued by major
problems concerning internal democracy. Information issued by the Department of Labor
on the number of complaints (filed under the provisions contained in the Landrum-
Griffin Act) about the way union elections were conducted and on the resolution
of these complaints shows that during fiscal years 1965 to 1974, only 239
claims that improper conduct affected the outcome of a union election
18'
were filed and ruled to have merit. Moreover, it is probably true that
in a fair number of these cases the violation was caused by ignorance of the
details of labor law on the part of union officials as opposed to an explicit
attempt to affect an election's outcome. Since approximately 200,000
elections were held by local, intermediate~ and international unions during
this period, the percentage of elections in which there were proved
violations is approximately .1 of one percent. While surely there were
some improper actionswhich affected an election's outcome but did not lead to
the filing of a complaint ruled to be meritorious, the miniscule number of
those that did suggests that the number of these actions was extremely
small.
While many national union leaders tend to remain ensconced in office
for years, at the local level a fair number of incumbents appear to be
unseated, as would be expected in a well-functioning democracy. One
pertinent study analyzed data on the turnover of union leaders in 94
locals in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin area during the two years from 1960
to 1962. It found that 40 percent of the officials in office at the
19 beginning of the, period were not in office at the end.34
The fact that the majority of members in most unions are satisfied
with the internal operation of unions can be supported with information on
the extent of union decertification in elections conducted by the National
Labor Relations Board. In each year during th~ past decade, only about .1
of one perc~nt of all union members were in bar~aining uni~ that voted
to decertify the union representing them. 20
Finally, recent surveys of members' views of the internal affairs in their
unions, presented in Table 6, indicate that the vast majority of members
were satisfied with the operation of the union. About 70 percent of members
said they had "no problems" with their union in 1972-73, while about 80
" percent had no problems in 1969-70. Roughly half of those who had problems in
1972-73 regarded them as "slight" or as "not really a problem at all." At
both points in time, less than 10 percent of union members were dissatisfied
with how democratically their unions were,run, the conduct of their unions'
leadership, or the officials' policies.
The internal operation of unions aside, the collective voice/institutional
response analysis stresses the role of unionism in increasing democracy at the
work place by providing workers with a mode of expressing their preferences to
management and of increasing workers'willingness to complain about undesirable
conditions. Evidence from surveys of workers' job satisfaction tends to suoport
this view. In these surveys the reported job satisfaction of unionized workers
is less than the reported satisfaction of comparable nonunion workers
who are paid the same amount. However, the union members are also more
likely to state that they are "unwilling to change jobs under any
circumstance" or "would never consider moving to a new job," than are
their "more satisfied" nonunion counterparts. The most direct interpretation
of the puzzle is that collective organization provides support that encourages
the voicing of dissatisfaction, a prerequisite for democnacy. In contrast
to most economic beneftts, which increase Doth utility and stated satisfaction,35
Table 6: Union Members' View of How their Unions are Run
Member Mentions Some Problem
with Operation of Union
Member Views Problem as great
as sizeable
as slight
as not really problem at all
















Union should be more democratically
run; leaders unresponsive
Union officials are too closely
tied to company
Union should change election
procedures
Membership should be kept informed
Union dues are too high, officials
paid too much
Graft or corruption among union
leaders
Union employs physical violence,
threats, or coercion against
present members or potential
members in places being organized
Union engages in political <1% 1%
activities which are not appropriate
Notes:
&Robert P. Quinn, Stanley E. Seashore, Thomas W. Mangione, Survey of Working Conditions,
November 1969-January 1970, (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan, 1972).
b
R. P. Quinn, et al., Survey of Working Conditions, Winter 1972-73 (Ann Arbor: Survey
Research Center, 1975).36
voice increases utility while increasing stated dissatisfaction.2l In
addition, since information about problems in a work place can be viewed
as a .public good, a union will collect more information than will any
individual, and then disseminate it all to each member. Hence, while
union members know that their jobs are significantly better than the
alternatives, they also know that their jobs are far from ideal. Since voice
is also a tool of conflict, good strategists, unlike Voltaire's Pangloss,
will not proclaim their work place as "the best of all'possible worlds."
What about the view that unions are corrupt institutions? The
evidence in Table 6 clearly runs counter to this stereotype. Ninety-
nine percent of union members in both 1969-70 and 1972-73 stated that
they had "no problems" with graft or corruption among their leaders.
Moreover, after a careful analysis of the extent of corruption in the
American Labor Movement, Derek Bok and John Dun1op,writing in 1970,
concluded:
Although the record in this country compares unfavorably with
that of many other nations, legal safeguards now go far to
curb dishonesty and encourage democratic behavior. Probably
only a tiny fraction of all union officialS in America would
stoop to serious abuse. The overwhelming majority of labor
leaders are honest men who take seriously their obligation
to represent the interest of the members who have elected
them to office.2~
Finally, in what ways has organized labor affected outcomes in the
American political arena? Have unions had a greater impac~ through
support of 'social' legislation that benefits lower income persons or
workers in general or through support of 'special_interest' legislation?
Despite the bad press given some union efforts to obtain special-
interest legislation, much union political muscle has been devoted to
progressive social policy which provides no obvious material gains to
unionizedworkers, save as members of the overall working population.37
For instance, organized labor was quite active in pushing for the passage
of the Public Accomodation Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
equal employment opportunity legislation, anti-poverty legislation, and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1971.
At the other end of the spectrum, most union-favored special-interest
legislation has failed to pass Congress, while important legislation opposed by
unions as detrimental to their power and survival has been passed. The last
major piece of legislation regulating collective bargaining and unionism, the
Landrum-Griffin bill, was enacted in 1959 over the vociferous opposition of
unions, while a 1977 mild labor law reform bill strongly favored by unions
failed to clear the Congress. Typically, only when unions align with
management in a particular sector in favor of legislation that will benefit
the sector have unions had success in gaining support for their special
interests.
All in all, while unions,. like other groups in a pluralist society,
have fought .for self-interest legislation, they have scored their great~st
political victories on more general social legislation. In terms of
actual outcomes, unions have been more effective as a voice of the whole
<
working population and the disadvantaged than as a monopoly institution
seeking to increase its monopoly power.
Explaining managerial opposition
If, in addition to its negative monopoly effects, trade unionism
is associated with substantial positive effects on the operation of the
economy and on the performance of firms, why do so many United States
enterprises oppose unions so vehemently?
While at present no detailed analysis of the factors underlying
managerial opposition exists, several seemingly important elements deserve mention.
First, it shou.;L.9:.J:?cLWlders-too.d that the bulk of the eeonomic gains due38
to unionism accrue to workers and not to owners or managers. Managers are
unlikely to perceive any personal benefits from their subordinates' unionization,
but are likely to be quite aware of the costs from a diminishment of power,
need to to work harder, loss of operating flexibility, and the like. Second,
while 'productivity might typically be higher in union than in otherwise
comparable nonunion work settings, so too are wages. It would seem, given the
objectives and actions of most unions, that the rate of return on capital would be
lower under collective bargaining, although important exceptions must be noted.
Thus, there is risk in unionization; the firm may be able to rationalize
operations, have good relations with the union, and maintain its profit rate,
or it may not. In addition, while the total cost of strikes to society as
a whole has been shown to be quite small, the potential cost to the
particular firm which is struck can be substantial. Granting that managers,
like most other peopl~are risk averse, we would expect opposition to
unions even if on average the benefits to the firm equal the costs.
Moreover, given the wide-ranging differences in the effects of unions on
economic performance, at least some managerial opposition arises from enterprises
where the benefits of collective bargaining may be small while the costs may be
high. Even the most vocal advocate of the collective voic~institutionalresponse
view of unionism would admit that, though functional in many industrial settings,
unions are not functional in others, and would expect greater managerial
opposition in the latter cases. Third, management may find unionism expensive,
difficult, and very threatening in its initial stages, when modes of operation must
be altered if efficiency is to be improved. New and different types of management
policies are needed under unionism, requiring changes in the behavior of current
management or, as appears to be the case in many just-organized firms, a
new 'set of managers. Finally, U.S. management has generally adopted an
ideology of top-down enlightened control, under which unions are seen as
both a cause and an effect of managerial failure. In this view, unions39
interfere with management's efforts to carry out its societal function:
ensuring that goods and services are produced efficiently. In addition,
unions typically come into existence because management has made mistakes
in dealing with its work force.
Conclusion
We believe that our analysis of unionism has opened up a host of
neglected issues regarding the key worker institution in the u.s. capitalist system
~nd gives a very different picture of that institution than currently
prevails. While sOme of our findings will surely be altered by additional
research and some (hopefully few) may be proven wrong, we do believe that
they present a reasonably valid picture of modern unionism in our country--
one which stands in sharp contrast to the monopoly model and many popular
beliefs about trade unions. If, as we have found, the positive collectiVe
voice/institutional response effects of unions are, in many
settings, more important than the negative monopoly effects, the on-going
dwindling of private sector unionism--a development unique to the
U.S. among Western developed countries--deserves serious public attention.40
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